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A NEW APPROACH FOR BOUNDING AWARDS IN 
BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 
 





The solution for the “Contested Garment Problem” proposed in the Babylonic 
Talmud, one of the most important sources of inspiration for solving situations where 
demand overcomes supply of some resources, suggests that each agent should receive at 
least some part of the available amount when facing these situations. This idea has been 
underlied the theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (O’Neill, 
1982) to present day (Dominguez and Thomsom, 2006). In this context, starting from 
the fact that a society establishes its own set of “Commonly Accepted Equity Principles”, 
we propose a new award bound by providing each agent her minimum amount 
according to all the admissible bankruptcy rules for such a society. Moreover, we analyze 
the recursive application of this new bound, since it will not exhaust the resources, in 
general. 
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1. Introduction
A bankruptcy problem re￿ ects a situation where a group of agents claim more quantity
of a good than available. According to that, a bankruptcy rule prescribes how to
share out an amount of a perfectly divisible resource, called estate, among a group of
agents, depending on a pro￿le of demands whose aggregate overcomes its supply. In
this context two natural questions arise: How should the available resources be rationed
among claimants? Should each agent have guaranteed a level of awards?
The main goal of the two approaches to the study of bankruptcy problems: the
axiomatic and the game theoretical methods, has been identifying bankruptcy rules by
means of appealing properties. Following this line, many authors have found reasonable
establishing some bound on awards. In fact, the formal de￿nition of a solution for
bankruptcy problems includes, by demanding that no agent gets more than her claim
and less than zero, both an upper and a lower bounds on awards. In 1982, O￿ Neill [15]
provides a new lower bound on awards called Respect of Minimal Right, which requires
that each claimant receives at least the available amount of the estate after the other
claimants have been fully compensated, or 0 if this amount is negative. Later, Herrero
and Villar [10, 11] introduce two properties that bound awards, called Sustainability and
Exemption. Sustainability says that, if we truncate all the claims by an agent i￿ s claim
and the bankruptcy problem becomes feasible, then agent i will receive all her claim.
Exemption requires that when equal division provides agent i more than her claim, agent
i should not be rationed. After that, Moulin [14] de￿nes a new restriction on awards,
called Lower Bound, which imposes that each agent has the amount corresponding to
the egalitarian division guaranteed except those who demand less, in which case their
demand is met in full. Afterwards, Moreno-Ternero and Villar [12] present a weaker
notion of Moulin￿ s Lower Bound, named Securement, which says that each agent should
receive at least the nth part of her claim truncated at the amount to divide. Finally,
Dominguez [7] proposes the Min Lower Bound, which modi￿es the previous one by
substituting each agent￿ s claim by the lowest one.
Apart from Respect of Minimal Right, property which is implied by the formal de￿n-
ition of a bankruptcy rule, the rest of the proposed limits on awards have been justi￿ed
by their own reasonability or appeal. Our goal is to establish restrictions on awards
taking as starting point a set, P, of ￿ basic￿requirements, called ￿ Commonly Accepted
Equity Principles￿ , on which a society could willingly agree. Then we consider the or-
dinary meaning of guarantee over all the bankruptcy rules satisfying properties in P as
follows. By applying to a bankruptcy problem all Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules
we determine the agent￿ s Minimal Safety as the lower amount she gets among those
ones provided by such rules. Finally, we de￿ne the associated bound on awards, Respect
of Minimal Safety, by demanding that each agent receives, at least her Minimal Safety.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 2
Since, in general, the aggregate guaranteed amount by means of our Minimal Safety
will not exhaust the available quantity of resources, we propose and analyze its recursive
application, that is, the limit of the following procedure. At the initial step, each agent
receives her Minimal Safety according to the original bankruptcy problem. At the
second step, we rede￿ne the residual bankruptcy problem, in which the estate is the
leftover resources, and the claims are adjusted down by the amounts just given; then
each agent receives her Minimal Safety of such a residual bankruptcy problem, and so
on. We call the bankruptcy rule obtained in this way the Recursive Minimal Safety
rule. This kind of process is not new, in fact it has already been used for introducing
bankruptcy rules by Alcalde et al. [2], who generalize the Ibn Ezra￿ s proposal, and by
Dominguez and Thomson [8], who propose the Recursive rule by using the Moreno-
Ternero and Villar￿ s concept of boundedness, among other authors.
In this paper we apply the previous methodology to di⁄erent sets of ￿ Commonly
Accepted Equity Principles￿ . First of all, we propose as basic properties the set P1, com-
posed by Resource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property. Resource
Monotonicity demands that if the estate increases, then all individuals should receive at
least as much as they did initially. Super-Modularity requires that if the estate increases,
then individuals with higher claims should receive a greater part of the increment than
those ones with lower claims. Midpoint Property says that if the estate is equal to the
sum of the half-claims, then every individual should get her half-claim. In this case
we ￿nd out that the Minimal Safety is the minimum of the two extreme bankruptcy
solutions in this set, the Piniles￿ rule (Piniles￿[17]) and its dual. Moreover, we prove
that the Recursive Minimal Safety rule retrieves the Dual Piniles￿ rule.
Secondly, considering a new set of equity principles, P2; we study the consequences
of weakening the requirements of the previous set of properties by both eliminating
Midpoint Property, and by substituting Super-Modularity by Order Preservation, which
demands that a bankruptcy rule provides higher awards and greater losses to agents
with higher claims. Then, we show that the associated Minimal Safety is the minimum
of two di⁄erent extreme bankruptcy solutions, the Constrained Equal awards rule (many
authors, see Thomson [19]) and its dual, the Constrained Equal Losses rule (Maimonides
12th Century, among others). Besides this, we demonstrate that the Recursive Minimal
Safety rule retrieves the Constrained Equal Losses rule.
The results previously mentioned could be written as follows: ￿ The recursive ap-
plication of the Minimal Safety recovers, in the set of all admissible bankruptcy rules
according to both P1 and P2, one of its extremes, that one providing more awards to
the higher claimants￿ . Then, the analysis of the generalization of this statement arises
as a natural question.
With this aim, we de￿ne the equity principles set P3 consisting of Resource Monotonic-
ity, Order Preservation and Midpoint Property. That is, a more permissive situation
than the ￿rst one, since we require Order Preservation instead of Super-Modularity, butA New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 3
more restrictive than the second one, because we add Midpoint Property to it.
Surprisingly enough, since P2 ￿ P3 ￿ P1, we show that not only this generalization
is not possible, but also that the way of sharing awards by means of the recursive
application of the Minimal Safety does not satisfy the equity principles which this
process is based on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model used
to analyze bankruptcy problems. Section 3 proposes the new approach for bounding
awards based on the concept of Minimal Safety and de￿nes its recursive application. Sec-
tion 4 applies previous ideas to di⁄erent sets of ￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Principles￿
providing new basis to classical bankruptcy rules. Section 5 shows the incompatibil-
ity of the proposed process with some ￿ appealing￿set of equity principles. Our main
conclusions are summarized in Section 6. Finally, technical proofs are relegated to the
Appendices.
2. Preliminaries
A bankruptcy problem is a situation where the agents￿demand of a good exceeds its
supply. Formally,






E is known as the estate, and represents the perfectly divisible good quantity that
should be distributed among the agents in N = f1;:::;i;:::;ng. Each agent i 2 N has
a claim ci on the estate, which together could be greater than the available amount.
Therefore, the resources to share should be rationed among agents.
Let B denote the set of all bankruptcy problems,
B=
(
(E;c) 2 R+ ￿ Rn










ci; by L the total amount of losses to distribute among the
agents, L = C ￿ E; and by B0 the set of bankruptcy problems in which claims are
increasingly ordered,
B0=f(E;c) 2 B : ci ￿ cj for i < jg:A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 4
A bankruptcy rule associates for each bankruptcy problem a distribution of the
available amount among the group of claimants. Next, we present this concept formally
and de￿ne the bankruptcy rules that will be used in the following sections, emphasizing
their dual relations.
De￿nition 2.2. A bankruptcy rule is a function, ’ : B ! Rn
+; such that for each
(E;c) 2 B; (a)
P
i2N
’i(E;c) = E (e¢ ciency) and
(b) 0 ￿ ’i(E;c) ￿ ci for each i 2 N (non-negativity and c-boundedness).
The Constrained Equal Awards rule (Maimonides 12th Century, among others) rec-
ommends equal gains to all claimants subject to no one receiving more than her claim.
Constrained Equal Awards rule, ’CEA: for each (E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
’CEA




Piniles￿ rule (Piniles￿[17]) assigns the Constrained Equal Awards rule when the
available amount is less than the half-sum of the claims. Otherwise, ￿rst each agent
receives her half-claim, then the Constrained Equal Award rule is re-applied to divide
the remainder but only taking into account the agents￿half-claims.





i (E;c=2) if E ￿ C=2
ci=2 + ’CEA
i (E ￿ C=2;c=2) if E ￿ C=2
:
The Constrained Egalitarian rule (Chun et al. [4]) is inspired by the Uniform rule, a
solution to the problem of fair division when the preferences are single-peaked. It makes
the minimal adjustment in the formula of the Uniform rule taking the half-claims as
the peak and guaranteeing that awards are ordered as claims are.





i (E;c=2) if E ￿ C=2
maxfci=2;minfci;￿gg if E ￿ C=2




i (E;c) = E:
Given a bankruptcy rule ’; its dual shares losses in the same way as ’ divides the
available amount (Aumann and Maschler [1]).
The dual bankruptcy rule of ’, denoted by ’d; assigns for each (E;c) 2 B and
each i 2 N; ’d
i(E;c) = ci ￿ ’i(L;c):
Note that for all bankruptcy solution ’, its dual is well de￿ned since given (E;c) 2 B;









= E and 0 ￿ ’d
i(E;c) ￿ ci for each i 2 N, that is, ’d
i is a bankruptcy solution.
The Constrained Equal Losses rule, discussed by Maimonides (Aumann and Maschler
[1]), is the dual of the Constrained Equal Awards rule (Herrero [9]). Speci￿cally, it
chooses the awards vector at which losses from the claims vector are the same for all
the agents subject to no-one receiving a negative amount.
Constrained Equal Losses rule, ’CEL: for each (E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N;
’CEL
i (E;c) ￿ maxf0;ci ￿ ￿g; where ￿ is chosen so that
P
i2N
maxf0;ci ￿ ￿g = E.
Dual Piniles￿ rule assigns the Constrained Equal Losses rule when the available
amount is less than the half-sum of the claims. Otherwise, ￿rst each agent receives her
half-claim, then the Constrained Equal Losses rule is re-applied to divide the remainder
but only taking into account the agents￿half-claims.




ci=2 ￿ minfci=2;￿g if E ￿ C=2
ci=2 + (ci=2 ￿ minfci=2;￿g) if E ￿ C=2
;




i (E;c) = E.
Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule gives the half-claims a central role and makes the
minimal adjustment in the formula of the Dual Uniform rule which guarantees that
losses are ordered as claims are.




ci ￿ maxfci=2;minfci;￿gg if E ￿ C=2
ci ￿ minfci=2;￿g if E ￿ C=2




i (E;c) = E:
Next, we introduce some properties of bankruptcy rules which, subsequently, will
be interpreted as ￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Principles￿ , and we present the notion of
Self-Duality between bankruptcy rules.
Resource Monotonicity, property considered by Curiel et al. [5] and Young [20],
among several authors, demands that if the estate increases, then all individuals should
receive at least as much as they did initially.
Resource Monotonicity: for each (E;c) 2 B and for each E0 2 R+ such that
C ￿ E0 > E; then ’i(E0;c) ￿ ’i(E;c); for each i 2 N:
Order Preservation, property introduced by Aumann and Maschler [1], requires re-
specting the claims order, i.e., if agent i￿ s claim is at least as large as agent j￿ s claim,
she should receive and lose at least as much as agent j does respectively.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 6
Order Preservation: for each (E;c) 2 B and each i;j 2 N such that ci ￿ cj; then
’i(E;c) ￿ ’j(E;c) and ci ￿ ’i(E;c) ￿ cj ￿ ’j(E;c):
Super-Modularity, property introduced by Dagan et al. [6], demands that if the
estate increases, then individuals with higher claims should receive a greater part of the
increment than those with lower claims.
Super-Modularity: for each (E;c) 2 B; all E0 2 R+ and each i;j 2 N such that
C ￿ E0 > E and ci ￿ cj; then ’i(E0;c) ￿ ’i(E;c) ￿ ’j(E0;c) ￿ ’j(E;c):
Midpoint Property, introduced by Chun, Schummer and Thomson [4], says that if
the estate is equal to the sum of the half-claims, then every individual should get her
half-claim.
Midpoint Property: for each (E;c) 2 B such that E = C=2; ’i(E;c) = ci=2; for
each i 2 N.
Self-Duality, implies that a bankruptcy rule treats symmetrically the problem of
dividing ￿ what is available￿and the problem of sharing ￿ what is missing￿ , so that the
amount received by any agent will be independent of the interpretation of the problem
when dividing gains or losses.
Self-Duality: for each (E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N; ’i(E;c) = ci ￿ ’i(L;c):
To conclude this Section, we present the idea of duality between properties, which
has been analyzed by many authors (see, for instance, Herrero and Villar [10] and Moulin
[13]).
Given two properties, P and P0; we say that they are dual if whenever a bankruptcy
rule, ’; satis￿es P, its dual bankruptcy rule, ’d; satis￿es P0. A property, P, is Self-
Dual when it coincides with its dual.
It is straightforward to check that all the properties previously introduced, Resource
Monotonicity, Order Preservation, Super-Modularity, and Midpoint Property, are Self-
Dual, fact that will be used later on.
3. A new approach: Bounding awards from equity principles.
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, most of the lower bounds on awards that have
been proposed in the Economic Literature have been justi￿ed by their own reasonability.
A clear exception is Respect of Minimal Right, which requires that each claimant receives
at least the available amount of the estate after the other claimants have been fully
compensated, or 0 if this amount is negative. This property, as Thomson [19] pointed
out, is a consequence of e¢ ciency, non-negativity and claim boundedness altogether
(See De￿nition 2.2).
In this Section we introduce a new method for bounding awards based on a set of
￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Principles￿ by a society. With this aim and consideringA New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 7
such a set of basic properties, next we propose the following extension of a bankruptcy
problem.
De￿nition 3.1. A Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles is a vector
(E;c;Pt) where (E;c) 2 B and Pt denotes a set of principles on which a society has
agreed.
From now on, let P be the set of all subsets of properties on bankruptcy rules, and
let BP be the set of all Bankruptcy Problems with Legitimate Principles,
BP =
(
(E;c;Pt) 2 R+ ￿ Rn






In this context, a Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rule is a bankruptcy rule which
satis￿es all the properties imposed by the society.
De￿nition 3.2. A Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rule is a function,
_
’ : BP ! Rn








’i(E;c;Pt) ￿ ci for each i 2 N, and
(c)
_
’ satis￿es all properties in Pt.
Let ￿ denote the set of all bankruptcy rules and let ￿(Pt) be the subset of bankruptcy
rules satisfying Pt.
Taking this kind of extended bankruptcy problems as a starting point, we propose
a new lower bound on awards based on the application of the ordinary meaning of
guarantee. That is, each agent will receive, at least, her Minimal Safety, which is the
lower amount among those ones provided by all the bankruptcy rules satisfying the
selected properties. Formally,




At this point, using the idea of guarantee previously introduced, our new lower bound
on awards, called Respect of Minimal Safety, demands that each claimant receives at
least her Minimal Safety.
De￿nition 3.4. Given Pt 2 P; a bankruptcy rule ’ satis￿es Respect of Minimal
Safety if for each (E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N; ’i(E;c) ￿ si(E;c;Pt):A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 8
Since, in general, the aggregate amount of a lower bound on awards will not exhaust
the available quantity of resources, properties requiring composition from such a lower
bound arise in a natural way. These properties ask the awards vector to be equivalently
obtainable (i) directly, or (ii) by ￿rst assigning to each agent her lower bound on awards,
adjusting claims down by these amounts, and ￿nally, applying the rule to divide the
remainder. The following de￿nition gathers this idea applied to our bound on awards.
De￿nition 3.5. Given Pt 2 P; a bankruptcy rule ’ satis￿es Minimal Safety First if
for each (E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N,




Although many of the proposed lower bound on awards are respected by most of
the bankruptcy rules, the composition from such lower bounds is quite demanding.
For instance, Respect of Minimal Right is satis￿ed by any bankruptcy rule, however
nor the Proportional, nor the Constrained Equal Awards neither the Minimal Overlap
rules satisfy Minimal Right First (See Thomson [19]). In fact, imposing this kind
of composition or equivalently applying a recursive method from a lower bound on
awards, has been used to propose new bankruptcy rules. Dom￿nguez and Thomson [8]
introduce, in this way, a new bankruptcy rule, named the Recursive rule, by requiring the
composition from Securement, the Moreno-Ternero and Villar￿ s concept of boundedness.
Next, following the previous ideas, we de￿ne the recursive application of our Minimal
Safety, which will be called the Recursive Minimal Safety Process.
De￿nition 3.6. The Recursive Minimal Safety Process, RMS, associates for each





where (E1;c1) ￿ (E;c) and for k ￿ 2;




According to this process, an agent will receive the sum, whenever it is well de￿ned,
of the amounts she gets in each of the following stages. At the initial step, we compute
the Minimal Safety of the original bankruptcy problem for each agent and we give it
to each claimant. At the second step, we rede￿ne the residual bankruptcy problem, in
which the estate is the remaining resources and the claims are adjusted down by the
amounts just given, then we again give each agent her Minimal Safety of such a residual
bankruptcy problem, and so on.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 9
Let us note that, in general, it can be ensured that the Recursive Minimal Safety
Process neither converges, nor provides a Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rule, but when
that happens, we will call it the Recursive Minimal Safety rule1.
De￿nition 3.7. The Recursive Minimal Safety rule,
_
’
R, associates for each













= E, and (ii)
_
’
R satis￿es all properties in Pt.
4. Two equity principles sets
In this Section we consider two possible choices of ￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Princi-
ples￿ by a society to apply the approach introduced previously for bounding awards.
Speci￿cally,
P1 = fResource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property} and
P2 = fResource Monotonicity and Order-Preservation}.
We think that all the equity principles compounding the set P1 could be generally
accepted. In fact, most of the proposed solutions satisfy Resource Monotonicity and
Super-Modularity and, in words of Aumann and Maschler [1], ￿ it is socially unjust for
di⁄erent creditors to be on opposite sides of the halfway point, C=2￿ .
At this point it would be worthwhile to dwell on the meaning of the above mentioned
properties. With respect to Resource Monotonicity simply let us comment that it has
not been proposed any bankruptcy rule violating this property, otherwise we could have
situations where more available amount would cause disadvantages to some agent.
A Super-Modular rule allocates each additional dollar in an ￿ order preserving￿man-
ner. Therefore, this property requires that if the estate increases, then individuals
with higher claims should receive a greater part of the increment than those with lower
claims. Apart from the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual, most of the proposed
bankruptcy rules satisfy this principle.
Finally, Midpoint Property can be interpreted as the requirement of Self-Duality of
a rule for the particular case in which the estate coincides with the sum of the half-
claims, since in this situation both gains and losses amounts to share are identical.
Above of being obviously satis￿ed by all the Self-Dual bankruptcy rules, this property
is also ful￿lled by some interesting non Self-Dual ones, such as the generalizations of
the Talmud rules introduced by Hokari and Thomson [16].
1Let us note that non-negativity and claim boundedness are satis￿ed by construction. Moreover, it
can be checked (by adapting the proof of the Remark 3) that whenever the Minimal Safety provides, in
each step, a positive amount to some agent, e¢ ciency is met.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 10
The conditions constituting P2, Resource Monotonicity and Order-Preservation, are
weaker than the previous ones, since they are obtained from the P1 set by both elim-
inating Midpoint Property and substituting Super-Modularity by Order Preservation.
These principles not only have been understood by many authors as the minimal re-
quirements of fairness (see for instance Young [20]), but also they are satis￿ed by all
the bankruptcy rules proposed in the Economic Literature. In this sense, let us point
out that Order-Preservation, which requires that higher claimants receive and support
at least the awards and losses provided to the lower ones, respectively, is a weakened
version of Super-Modularity.
Next results are used to ￿nd out the bankruptcy rules which mark out the region of
admissible path of awards satisfying properties in P1. Bosmans [3] introduced the ￿rst
one, and starting from it, the second Theorem can be obtained straightforwardly taking
into the fact that all the properties considered are Self-Dual and the concept of dual
bankruptcy rule.
Theorem 4.1. (Bosmans and Lauwers, 2007)
Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule satisfying properties in P1, then for each (E;c) 2 B
the Piniles￿rule is the only rule such that the gap between the smallest and the largest
amount any claimant receives is the smallest, and the variance of the amounts received
by all the claimants is the smallest.
Theorem 4.2. Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule satisfying properties in P1, then for each
(E;c) 2 B the Dual Piniles￿rule is the only rule such that the gap between the smallest
and the largest loss any claimant supports is the smallest, and the variance of the losses
supported by all the claimants is the smallest.
Analogously, following Schummer and Thomson [18], we provide the results used
to de￿ne the bankruptcy rules marking out the region of admissible path of awards
satisfying properties in P2.
Theorem 4.3. (Schummer and Thomson, 1997)
Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule, then for each (E;c) 2 B the Constrained Equal
Awards rule is the only rule such that the gap between the smallest and the largest
amount any claimant receives is the smallest, and the variance of the amounts received
by all the claimants is the smallest.
Theorem 4.4. Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule, then for each (E;c) 2 B the Constrained
Equal Losses rule is the only rule such that the gap between the smallest and the largest
loss any claimant supports is the smallest, and the variance of the losses supported by
all the claimants is the smallest.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 11
At this point is worth noticing that, since the Constrained Equal Losses and the
Constrained Equal Awards rules satisfy Resource Monotonicity and Order Preservation,
these results will remain valid when restricting the bankruptcy rules to those belonging
to P2.
Figures 1 and 2 represent graphically the previous results for two-person bankruptcy
problems. Figure 1 shows the bankruptcy rules marking out the area of all admissible
paths satisfying properties in P1. Analogously, in Figure 2 it can be observed the paths of
those rules delimiting the area in P2. Let us note that any bankruptcy rule which is out
of the corresponding area will not satisfy any of the equity principles compounding the
sets P1 or P2, respectively. For instance, in Figure 2, any solution providing a sharing in
the area of the triangle de￿ned by the vectors (0;0), (0;c1) and (c1;c1) will recommend
greater awards to the lowest claimant, in contradiction with Order Preservation. In the
Figure 1, any solution satisfying Midpoint Property and providing agent one more than
her half claim when the estate is lower than the sum of the half-claims, will not satisfy
Resource Monotonicity.
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2
Next two lemmas, whose proofs are omitted since they follow straightforwardly from
the above theorems, determine the Minimal Safety for both P1 and P2. In this regard,
let us note that given a bankruptcy problem, (E￿;c) 2 B; the admissible sharings
will be some point belonging to the segment de￿ned by the vectors ’Pin(E￿;c) and
’DPin(E￿;c); when considering P1: Analogously, the vectors ’CEA(E￿;c) and ’CEL(E￿;c)
are the extremes of the segment of admissible sharings if society agrees on P2.
















The following theorems prove that the recursive application of the Minimal Safety
retrieves, for P1 and P2 the Dual Piniles￿ and the Constrained Equal Losses rules,
respectively.










FIGURE 1: Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules set in P1. The black 
lines represent all the possible sharing of two different levels of the estate (E 
and  E’). The dots and the squares show φPin and φDPin, which are the 
bankruptcy rules marking out the area of all the admissible path of awards 
satisfying the properties in P₁. The cross point between the estate lines and 
φPin is the sharing of the resources between the two claimants provided by this 
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FIGURE 2: Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules set in P2. The black 
lines represent all the possible sharing of two different levels of the estate (E 
and  E’). The dots and the squares show φCEA and φCEL, which are the 
bankruptcy rules marking out the area of all the admissible path of awards 
satisfying the properties in P2. The cross point between the estate lines and 
the φCEA is the sharing of the resources between the two claimants provided 
by this rule (analogously for φCEL). 
c1/2 
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Proof. See Appendix 3.
To conclude this Section, let us note that, in the two considered sets of properties
the associated Minimal Safety is de￿ned as the minimum of both a classical bankruptcy
rule and its dual. These rules represent the extreme and opposite ways of sharing awards
among con￿ icting claims in the set of Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules according
to the imposed requirements. Moreover we have proved, contrary to the ￿rst intuition
which would be to get something in the middle of these extreme rules when applying
the recursive procedure, that the corresponding Recursive Minimal Safety rule retrieves
one of the such extremes, the one favoring the largest claims. In this sense, our results
can be interpreted as new basis for old bankruptcy rules. So that, a natural question,
analyzed in the next Section, would be:
￿ For any appealing equity principles set,
Would the recursive application of its Minimal Safety recover one of the extremes
which de￿ne the area of all the Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules?￿
5. An incompatibility result
In this Section we show that, in general, the recursive application of our new lower
bound on awards does not provide one of the extreme bankruptcy rules satisfying the
considered equity principle set. Even more and surprisingly enough, we ￿nd out that
the bankruptcy rule obtained by means of our procedure does not always satisfy the
properties which it is based on, that is, it would not be a Socially Admissible Bankruptcy
rule.
Let us consider the set of equity principles P3 by adding to that ones de￿ning P2
the Midpoint Property. So that we are proposing an ￿ intermediate￿ situation more
permissive than P1, since we require Order Preservation instead of Super-Modularity,
but more restrictive than P2. That is,
P3 ={Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation and Midpoint Property}.
The following result, due to Chun, Schummer and Thomson [4], is used to ￿nd out
the one of the extremes bankruptcy rule satisfying the properties in P3.
Theorem 5.1. (Chun, Schummer and Thomson, 2001)
Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule satisfying Resource Monotonicity and Midpoint Prop-
erty, then for each (E;c) 2 B the Constrained Egalitarian rule is the only rule such
that the gap between the smallest and the largest amount any claimant receives is the
smallest, and the variance of the amounts received by all the claimants is the smallest.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 13
Taking into account the previous result, the fact that all the considered properties
are Self-Dual and the concept of dual bankruptcy rule, the next theorem, whose proof
we omit since it is obvious, determines the another extreme bankruptcy rule satisfying
properties in P3.
Theorem 5.2. Let ’ be any bankruptcy rule satisfying Resource Monotonicity and
Midpoint Property, then for each (E;c) 2 B the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule is
the only rule such that the gap between the smallest and the largest loss any claimant
supports is the smallest, and the variance of the losses supported by all the claimants
is the smallest.
At this point is worth noticing that the Dual Constrained Egalitarian and the Con-
strained Egalitarian rules satisfy Order Preservation. Therefore, the previous results
will remain valid when restricting the bankruptcy rules to those belonging to P3.
The Figure 3 represents graphically the previous result for two-person bankruptcy
problems.
INSERT FIGURE 3
Next lemma follows straightforwardly from the above theorems and determines the
Minimal Safety for P3.








In this context, we show that, although for the two-person bankruptcy problems
the recursive application of the Minimal Safety for P3 retrieves the Dual Constrained
Egalitarian rule, this fact can not be generalized.
Theorem 5.4. For each two-person Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles in




i (E;c;P3) = ’DCe
i (E;c):
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Proposition 5.5. There is a bankruptcy problem, (E;c) 2 B; such that
RMS(E;c;P3) 6= ’DCe(E;c):
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Our next proposition points out that the composition of ￿ appealing￿equity principles
and ￿ natural￿processes for ￿nding solutions does not always guarantee desirable results.
Particularly, it emphasizes both the need of being very careful when establishing the
equity principles of the society if the procedure seems appropriated, and the need of





























FIGURE 3: Socially Admissible Bankruptcy rules set in P3 The black lines represent all the possible sharing of two 
different levels of the estate (E and E’). The dots and squares show φCe and φDCe, which are the bankruptcy rules marking out 
the area of all the admissible path of awards satisfying the properties in P3. The cross point between the estate lines and φCe 
is the sharing of the resources between the two claimants provided by this rule (analogously for φDCE). A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 14
Proposition 5.6. The Recursive Minimal Safety Process for P3 does not satisfy Re-
source Monotonicity.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Let us conclude this Section noting that, probably, it would not be di¢ cult ￿nd-
ing a society which accepts Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation and Midpoint
Property, willingly, and which considers fairly ￿ natural￿our Recursive Minimal Safety
process. However, we are sure that the result of this puzzle would not be accepted by
any member of such a society, since it provides a bankruptcy rule which does not satisfy
one of the equity principles upon which the society initially agreed to found its decisions;
that is, Resource Monotonicity, one of the properties considered unquestionable in the
Economic Literature.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we again take up a research line which has been underlaid the theoretical
analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning: the search of a ￿ fair￿minimum
amount that each agent should receive when facing these situations.
In this context, our main contribution is a new method for bounding awards based
on a set of ￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Principles￿by a society. Starting from this set,
the award bound we propose, called Minimal Safety, is obtained by assigning each agent
her minimum amount according to all admissible bankruptcy rules for such a society.
In general, once we allocate each agent her Minimal Safety, some part of the resources
will still be available, fact that leads us to introduce the Recursive Minimal Safety rule,
which lies in the recursive application of our new bound.
First, we apply the previous methodology to two di⁄erent equity principles sets that,
from our point of view, could be interpreted as social basic requirements. These are
P1={Resource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property} and
P2={Resource Monotonicity and Order Preservation}. In these cases we ￿nd out that
the distribution recommended coincides with one of the extremes of the set of Socially
Admissible Bankruptcy rules: the Dual Piniles￿and the Constrained Equal Losses rules,
both of those providing more awards to the higher claimants.
Next, we ascertain that not only the previous results can not be generalized, but
also that the composition of both ￿ reasonable￿equity principles and recursive process,
a ￿ standard￿way of exhausting the resources, does not always provide desirable results.
To show this fact we do not need to de￿ne a complicated or arti￿cial set of ￿ Commonly
Accepted Equity Principles￿ . Rather the contrary, by considering an ￿ intermediate￿
situation, P3={Resource Monotonicity, Order Preservation and Midpoint Property};A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 15
we show that Recursive Minimal Safety rule does not satisfy Resource Monotonicity,
one of the equity principles upon which the society initially agreed to found its deci-
sions. Therefore, this result emphasizes the necessity of analyzing the consequences of
the social agreements on both principles and procedure, since when put together could
become meaningless.
Finally, let us note that the application of our analysis on losses is straightforward
by using the idea of duality. In this context the starting point will be the same sets
of ￿ Commonly Accepted Equity Principles￿ , P1, P2 and P3, since all the considered
properties are Self-Dual. Moreover, de￿ning the Minimal Safety on losses, which could
be called Minimal Damage, and applying it recursively the following results can be
obtained. On the one hand, the Piniles￿ and the Constrained Equal Awards rules can
be retrieved for P1 and P2 respectively. And on the other hand, for P3, the Constrained
Egalitarian rule arises for two-person bankruptcy problems by means of this process,
but our approach does not guarantee a Socially Admissible Solution for the n-person
case, since this procedure does not satisfy Resource Monotonicity.
To conclude this paper we would like to remark that our axiomatic analysis:
(i) O⁄ers the understanding of old bankruptcy rules from a new angle.
(ii) Warns of the dangers that may involve the composition of ￿ a priori￿appro-
priate pieces of a puzzle, and
(iii) Strengthens and complements the strategic study of the Constrained Equal
Losses rule provided by Herrero [9], since totally di⁄erent starting points, although with
somehow similar mathematical modelization, retrieve the same bankruptcy solution; the
axiomatic and the strategic approaches converge.
Therefore, the following questions remain opened: the analysis of the possible inter-
pretation from the strategic point of view of the Dual Piniles￿and the Dual Constrained
Egalitarian rules; the search of new procedures which ensure the compatibility with so-
cially accepted equity principles; and the analysis of conditions that should be imposed
on the legitimate principle sets for guaranteeing their ful￿llment when applying our
recursive process.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 16
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APPENDIX 1. General Remarks
Next we present three Remarks which will be used in the proofs provided in Ap-
pendices 2, 3 and 4. Moreover, from now on, m 2 N will denote the m-th step of the
Recursive Minimal Safety Process, that is,
(E1;c1) ￿ (E;c) and for m ￿ 2;




The ￿rst Remark states that for any Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles,
the amount of losses to distribute among agents is the same at every step of the Recursive
Minimal Safety Process.
Remark 1. For each (E;c;Pt) 2 BP and each m 2 N; Lm = L:
Proof. Let (E;c;Pt) 2 BP;



















= C ￿ E = L:
The second Remark establishes, for P1, P2 and P3; that the order of the agents￿
claims is ￿xed along the di⁄erent steps of the Recursive Minimal Safety Process.

























Taking into account that all the above mentioned bankruptcy rules satisfy Order Preser-
vation, we get for any t 2 f1;2;3g:
(a) If sm
i (E;c;Pt) = ’
L(Pt)
i (Em;cm) and sm
j (E;c;Pt) = ’
L(Pt)
j (Em;cm); or al-
ternatively, sm
i (E;c;Pt) = ’
U(Pt)
i (Em;cm) and sm
j (E;c;Pt) = ’
U(Pt)
j (Em;cm); by Order
Preservation, cm
i ￿ sm
i (Em;cm;Pt) ￿ cm
j ￿ sm




i (E;c;Pt) = ’
L(Pt)
i (Em;cm) and sm






i (Em;cm) ￿ cm
j ￿’
L(Pt)




since, by de￿nition of sm
j (E;c;Pt); ’
U(Pt)
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i (Em;cm) ) sm
j (E;c;Pt) = ’
U(Pt)
j (Em;cm):
The last Remark shows that, for any t 2 f1;2;3g; the Recursive Minimal Safety
Process converges.




Proof. Let (E;c;Pt) 2 BP; with t 2 f1;2;3g; and let denote by c￿ and E￿ the limits
of the sequences of the claims and the estate arising in the Recursive Minimal Safety
Process, respectively. Let us note that these limits exist since each agent￿ s claim and
the estate do not increase from a step to the next one, and both of them are lower
bounded by zero. Next, we show by contradiction that E￿ = 0: Let us suppose that
E￿ > 0; then by de￿nition of limit and taking into account that for any t 2 f1;2;3g;
sj(E￿;c￿;Pt) > 0; being j the highest claimant, we know that 9k 2 N such that




is a well-de￿ned Bankruptcy Problem with
Legitimate Principles, sj(Ek;ck;Pt) > 0, and given that all agents receive non-negative
amounts, the estate to divide at the (k + 1)￿th step decreases by at least the j￿ s Min-
imal Safety.
Therefore, Ek+1 ￿ Ek ￿ sj(Ek;ck;Pt) < Ek ￿ sj(E￿;c￿;Pt) ￿ E￿; which contradicts
the de￿nition of E￿:A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 20
APPENDIX 2. Proof of Theorem 4.7
This Appendix provides a formal proof of the following result:




Where, taking into account Lemma 4.5, Remark 3 and De￿nition 3.7, for each










The proof of this result will be based on ￿ve Lemmas, but before presenting them,
it is worth noticing the following two Facts. In all of them we will consider, without
loss of generality, (E;c) 2 B0.
Fact 1. Let us note that the de￿nition of the Dual Piniles￿ rule can be written as















if E ￿ C=2
;




i (E;c) = E.
Moreover, given E1 > C=2 and E2 = E1 ￿C=2; the corresponding ￿ for (E1;c) and















= C=2 ￿ E2 = C ￿ E1:
It is straightforward to check that a way of computing this bankruptcy rule, that
will be useful later on, is as follows.
Given (E;c) 2 B0; and for each i 2 N; the amount of losses supported by agent i
according to ’DPin will be
￿i =
( ci
2 + minfci=2;￿ig if E ￿ C=2
minfci=2;￿￿
ig if E ￿ C=2


















A=(n ￿ i + 1):
Therefore,
’DPin
i (E;c) = ci ￿ ￿i 8i 2 N:
Fact 2. Taking into account the previous Fact and the Remark 1, we get:
(a) Given (E;c) 2 B0 and 8i 2 N;
(i) when E ￿ C=2; if ￿i = ci ) ￿j = cj 8j < i:
(ii) when E ￿ C=2; if ￿i = ci=2 ) ￿j = cj=2 8j < i:
(b) Given (E;c) 2 B0 and 8 i 2 N;
(i) when E ￿ C=2; if ￿i = ci=2 + ￿i ) ￿i = ￿ and 8j > i;￿j = ￿i:
Therefore, ￿i = ci=2 + ￿:
(ii) when E ￿ C=2; if ￿i = ￿i ) ￿i = ￿ and 8j > i;￿j = ￿i:
Therefore, ￿i = ￿:
(c) At every step m 2 N, ￿m
i will only depend on the initial bankruptcy
problem, (E;c); and on the claims, at step m, corresponding to the agents
j 2 N such that j < i:
Next, we provide the ￿ve Lemmas on which Theorem 4.7 is based. The ￿rst Lemma
shows that the relationship among claims and ￿ is ￿xed.
Lemma 6.1. For each (E;c) 2 B0 and each m 2 N;
(a) if cm
i =2 < ￿m; then cm+1
i =2 < ￿m
and
(b) if cm
i =2 > ￿m; then cm+1
i =2 ￿ ￿m:A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 22
Proof. The part (a) is obvious by considering Fact 1.
In order to prove (b) let us consider the two following cases.
(Case b.1) If E ￿ C=2; let agent i be the ￿rst agent who receives a positive
amount of awards at step m 2 N, i.e., (i) si(Em;cm;P1) > 0 and (ii) sj(Em;cm;P1) =
= 0;8j < i. By (i) and Fact 2, cm
i =2 > ￿m = ￿m




for any t 2 f1;2;3g; cm+1
j = cm
j :
Taking into account Fact 2-(c), ￿m+1
i = ￿m




i =2 = cm







￿ cm=2 ￿ ’DPin
i (Em;cm) = cm
i =2 ￿ (cm
i =2 ￿ minfcm
i =2;￿mg) =
= minfcm
i =2;￿mg = ￿m:
Therefore, cm+1
i =2 ￿ ￿m = ￿m
i :
(Case b.2) If E ￿ C=2; taking into account that agents receive their half-claim
and the remained estate is distributed as previously, see Fact 1, the conclusion follows
straightforwardly.
The second Lemma says that ￿ is always the same.
Lemma 6.2. For each (E;c) 2 B0 and each m 2 N; ￿m = ￿m+1; which solved P
i2N
’DPin




i (Em+1;cm+1) = Em+1, respectively.
Proof. Let us note that given Fact 1, ￿i represents the amount of losses supported by
each agent, and this will not change whenever ￿i does not change. By construction, ￿i
will be the same whenever the relationship among claims and ￿ is ￿xed. By Remark 2,





From now on, ￿ will denote ￿m; 8m 2 N:
The third Lemma that we present says that if at some step m 2 N the agent￿ s i
Minimal Safety for P1 is ’DPin
i (Em;cm); then in the following steps her Minimal Safety
for P1 will be zero.
Lemma 6.3. For each (E;c) 2 B0; if 9m 2 N such that si(Em;cm;P1) = ’DPin
i (Em;cm)
then,
si(Em+h;cm+h;P1) = 0; for each h 2 N:A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 23
Proof. We are going to prove that if si(Em;cm;P1) = ’DPin
i (Em;cm); then
si(Em+1;cm+1;P1) = ’DPin
i (Em+1;cm+1) = 0:
Let (E;c) 2 B0 and m 2 N such that
si(Em;cm;P1) = ’DPin
i (Em;cm):
(Case a) Em ￿ Cm=2 and ￿ ￿ cm
i =2; then
’DPin
i (Em;cm) = 0 and cm+1










i (Em+1;cm+1) = cm+1






(Case b) Em ￿ Cm=2 and ￿ < cm
i =2; then
’DPin
i (Em;cm) = cm
i =2 ￿ minfcm
i =2;￿g = cm
i =2 ￿ ￿:
Thus,
cm+1








i =2 ￿ (cm
i =2 ￿ ￿) = ￿:
Therefore,
’DPin
i (Em+1;cm+1) = cm+1






= ￿ ￿ minf￿;￿g = 0:
(Case c) Em ￿ Cm=2, taking into account that agents receive their half-claim
and the remained estate is distributed as previously, see Fact 1, the conclusion follows
straightforwardly.
Let us note that considering Fact 1 again, we have that once ’DPin
i (Em;cm) = 0;
then ’DPin
i (Em+h;cm+h) = 0;8h 2 N, so the agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for P1 will be
from this step on always zero.
Next Lemma establishes that, if agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for P1 is, at every step,
the amount provided by the Piniles￿ rule, then the total amount received by this agent
will be at most her distribution corresponding to the Dual Piniles￿ rule applied to the
initial problem.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 24
Lemma 6.4. For each (E;c) 2 B0; given i 2 N; if si(Em;cm;P1) = ’Pin
i (Em;cm) for









Proof. Let (E;c) 2 B0 and i 2 N;
(Case a) First let us consider Em ￿ Cm=2 8m 2 N: If si(Em;cm;P1) =
= ’Pin
i (Em;cm) 8m 2 N; then by Lemma 4.5,
si(Em;cm;P1) ￿ ’DPin
i (Em;cm) = cm












(Case b) If Em ￿ Cm=2, then m = 1. Now, taking into account that agents
receive their half-claim and the remained estate is distributed as in case 1 (See Fact 1)
the proof follows straightforwardly.
The last Lemma that we present states that once the agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for
P1 is the amount provided by the Dual Piniles￿ rule, then the total amount received
by this agent at that step will correspond with that one given by this bankruptcy rule
applied to the initial problem.














Proof. Let (E;c) 2 B0.








i (Em￿￿1;cm￿￿1);A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 25
by construction, ’Pin
i (Em￿￿1;cm￿￿1) > 0 and by Lemma 4.5, ’DPin
i (Em￿￿1;cm￿￿1) >
> 0; given Fact 1, cm￿￿1
i =2 > ￿ and by Lemma 6.2, cm￿
i =2 ￿ ￿:
Then, at step m￿; Em￿
￿ Cm￿



































= ci=2 ￿ ￿ = ’DPin
i (E;c):
















































> 0: Therefore, by Fact 1 and Lemma 6.2, cm￿￿1
i =2 > ￿; ) cm￿


































































= ci=2 ￿ ￿ = ’DPin











;ck;P1) = ci ￿ ￿ = ’DPin
i (E;c):




Proof. Let (E;c) 2 B. Let￿ s consider all of the possible cases.
(Case a) All of the agents claim the same amount. Then, by the De￿nition of
the Minimal Safety for P1, each agent receives the same amount and the total estate is
completely distributed at the ￿rst step. This amount corresponds with that provided
by ’DPin(E;c).
(Case b) There are at least two agents with di⁄erent claims. By construction,
given Fact 1 the agent with the smallest claim, say i, has as Minimal Safety for P1,
si(E;c;P1) = ’DPin
i (E;c): Moreover, the agent with the highest claim, say j; has as
Minimal Safety for P1, sj(Em;cm;P1) = ’Pin
j (Em;cm) for all m 2 N: Now, by Lemmas
6.3 and 6.5 we know that for each agent r 2 N who at some step m 2 N receive
’DPin




r (E;c;P1) = ’DPin
r (E;c). For




l (E;c;P1) ￿ ’DPin
l (E;c): Then, since
_
’
R(E;c;P1) exhausts the estate, by Remark 3,
_
’
R(E;c;P1) = ’DPin(E;c):A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 27
APPENDIX 3. Proof of Theorem 4.8
This Appendix provides a formal proof of the following result:




Where, taking into account Lemma 4.6, Remark 3 and De￿nition 3.7,










The proof of this result will be based on four Lemmas, but before presenting them,
it is worth noticing the following two Facts. In all of them we will consider, without
loss of generality, (E;c) 2 B0.
Fact 3. Given (E;c) 2 B0; i 2 N; the de￿nition of the Constrained Equal Losses rule
is,
’CEL
i (E;c) = maxf0;ci ￿ ￿g;
where
￿ is such that
X
i2N
maxf0;ci ￿ ￿g = E:
Therefore, ￿ can be understood as the losses supported by the agents who receive
a positive amount of awards applying the Constrained Equal Losses rule. It is straight-
forward to check that a way of computing this bankruptcy rule, that will be useful later
on, is as follows.
Given (E;c) 2 B0; and for each i 2 N; the amount of losses supported by agent i










A=(n ￿ i + 1):
Therefore,
’CEL
i (E;c) = ci ￿ ￿i;8i 2 N:
Fact 4. Taking into account the previous Fact and the Remark 1 we get:
(a) Given (E;c) 2 B0; i 2 N; if ￿i = ci ) ￿j = cj 8j < i:
(b) Given i 2 N; if ￿i = ￿i ) ￿i = ￿ and 8j > i;￿j = ￿i:
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(c) At every step m 2 N, ￿m
i will only depend on the initial bankruptcy
problem, (E;c); and on the claims, at step m, corresponding to the
agents j 2 N such that j < i:
Next, we provide the four Lemmas on which Theorem 4.8 is based.
Lemma 6.6. For each (E;c) 2 B0 and each m 2 N; ￿m+1 = ￿m:
Proof. Let agent i be the ￿rst agent who receives a positive amount of awards at step
m 2 N, i.e., (i) si(Em;cm;P2) > 0 and (ii) sj(Em;cm;P2) = 0;8j < i. By (i) and Fact 4,
cm
i > ￿m = ￿m
i : Given (ii) and De￿nition 3.7, of
_
’
RPt, for any t 2 f1;2;3g; cm+1
j = cm
j :
Taking into account Fact 4-(c), ￿m+1
i = ￿m













i (Em;cm) = cm
i ￿ (cm
i ￿ ￿m) =
= ￿m = ￿m+1
i :
Therefore, by Remark 2 and Fact 4-(b), ￿m+1
i = ￿m+1
i = ￿m+1:
From now on, ￿ will denote ￿m; 8m 2 N:
The second Lemma that we present says that if at some step m 2 N the agent￿ s i
Minimal Safety for P2 is ’CEL
i (Em;cm); then in the following steps her Minimal Safety
for P2 will be zero.
Lemma 6.7. For each (E;c) 2 B0; if 9m 2 N such that si(Em;cm;P2) = ’CEL
i (Em;cm)
then,
si(Em+h;cm+h;P2) = 0; for each h 2 N:
Proof. We are going to prove that if si(Em;cm;P2) = ’CEL
i (Em;cm) then
si(Em+1;cm+1;P2) = ’CEL
i (Em+1;cm+1) = 0:
Let (E;c) 2 B0 and m 2 N such that
si(Em;cm;P2) = ’CEL







i (Em;cm) = ci
m ￿ (cm
i ￿ minfcm
i ;￿g) = minfcm
i ;￿g:A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 29
Therefore,
’CEL








i ;￿g ￿ minfminfcm
i ;￿g;￿g =
= minfcm
i ;￿g ￿ minfcm
i ;￿g = 0:
Let￿ s note that given Fact 3, once ’CEL
i (Em;cm) = 0; then ’CEL
i (Em+h;cm+h) =
= 0;8h 2 N, so the agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for P2 will be from this step on always
zero.
Next Lemma establishes that, if agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for P2 is, at every step, the
amount provided by the Constrained Equal Awards rule, then the total amount received
by this agent will be at most her distribution corresponding to the Constrained Equal
Losses rule applied to the initial problem.
Lemma 6.8. For each (E;c) 2 B0; given i 2 N; if si(Em;cm;P2) = ’CEA
i (Em;cm) for









Proof. Let (E;c) 2 B0 and i 2 N;
If 8m 2 N, si(Em;cm;P2) = ’CEA
i (Em;cm) ; then by Lemma 4.6, si(Em;cm;P1) ￿
￿ ’CEL
i (Em;cm) = cm
i ￿ ￿ = ci ￿
m￿1 P
k=1









The last Lemma that we present says that once the agent￿ s i Minimal Safety for P2
is the amount provided by the Constrained Equal Losses rule, then the total amount
received by this agent at that step will correspond with that one given by the Constrained
Equal Losses applied to the initial problem.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 30























i (Em￿￿1;cm￿￿1) > 0; ’CEL
i (Em￿￿1;cm￿￿1) > 0: Therefore cm￿￿1
i > ￿ and by
Lemma 6.6, cm￿
i ￿ ￿:





















































Proof. Let (E;c) 2 B. Let￿ s consider all of the possible cases.
(Case a) All of the agents claim the same amount. Then, by the De￿nition of
Minimal Safety for P2 , each agent receives the same amount and the total estate is
completely distributed at the ￿rst step. This amount corresponds with that provided
by ’CEL(E;c).A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 31
(Case b) There are at least two agents with di⁄erent claims. By construction,
in this case the agent with the smallest claim, say i; receives as Minimal Safety for
P2; si(E;c;P2) = ’CEL
i (E;c): Moreover, the agent with the highest claim, say j; receives
as Minimal Safety for P2; sj(E;c;P2) = ’CEA
j (Em;cm) for all m 2 N: Now, by Lemmas
6.7 and 6.9 we know that for each agent r 2 N who at some step m 2 N receives
’CEL




r (E;c;P2) = ’CEL
r (E;c). For




l (E;c;P2) ￿ ’CEL
l (E;c): Then, since
_
’
R(E;c;P2) exhausts the estate, by Remark 3,
_
’
R(E;c;P2) = ’CEL(E;c):A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 32
APPENDIX 4. Proof of Theorem 5.4
This Appendix provides a formal proof of the following result:
Theorem 5.4. For each two-person Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles




i (E;c;P3) = ’DCe
i (E;c):
Where, taking into account Lemma 5.3, Remark 3 and De￿nition 3.7, for each










At this point it is worth noticing the following two Facts, in which we will consider,
without loss of generality, (E;c) 2 B0.
Fact 5. Let us note that the de￿nition of the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule can be




ci ￿ maxfci=2;minfci;￿gg if E ￿ C=2
ci ￿ minfci=2;￿g if E ￿ C=2
;




i (E;c) = E.
From the previous expression, it is obvious that agent one will receive nothing when
minfc2 ￿ c1;c2=2g ￿ E:
The following Fact gives us the two conditions used in the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Fact 6. Let (E;c) 2 B0 a two-person bankruptcy problem. Then given Fact 5 and the
de￿nition of the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule, at any step m 2 N, s1(Em;cm;P3) =
= ’DCe
1 (Em;cm). Therefore:
(i) Next inequality characterizes the fact that agent one has guaranteed nothing at
any step m 2 N
s1(Em;cm;P3) = 0 , minfcm
2 ￿ cm
1 ;cm
2 =2g ￿ Em: (6.1)
(ii) The previous characterization for step m 2 N implies the following conditions in
terms of the bankruptcy problem at the step m ￿ 1;
Em ￿ cm
2 ￿ cm
1 , Em￿1 ￿ s1(Em￿1;cm￿1;P3) ￿ s2(Em￿1;cm￿1;P3) ￿
￿ cm￿1
2 ￿ s2(Em￿1;cm￿1;P3) ￿ (cm￿1
1 ￿ s1(Em￿1;cm￿1;P3))
so that, for m = 2, E2 ￿ c2
2 ￿ c2
1 , E ￿ c2 ￿ c1 + 2s1(E;c;P3): (6.2)A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 33
Moreover, E2 ￿ c2
2=2 , E ￿ s1(E;c;P3) ￿ s2(E;c;P3) ￿ c2=2 ￿ s2(E;c;P3)=2
so that, E2 ￿ c2
2=2 , E ￿ c2=2 + s2(E;c;P3)=2 + s1(E;c;P3): (6.3)
:
Proof of Theorem 5.4
For each two-person bankruptcy problem, (E;c) 2 B0; we have by Fact5 that at any
step m 2 N, s1(Em;cm;P3) = ’DCe
1 (Em;cm); and s2(Em;cm;P3) =
= ’Ce
2 (Em;cm): Given this, we show that agent one￿ s Minimal Safety for P3 at any step
m ￿ 2, will be zero, so the agent one￿ s Recursive Minimal Safety rule for P3 will cor-








2 (E;c;P3) = ’DCe
2 (E;c):
If c1 = c2; by the De￿nition of the Recursive Minimal Safety rule for P3, each agent
i receives the same amount at the initial step, and if c1 6= c2; with E = (c1 + c2)=2 by
Midpoint Property each agent i receives her half-claim, ci=2. Therefore in both cases at
the initial step the estate is completely distributed, and this amount correspond with
that one given by the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule.
Next we consider three possible cases when c1 6= c2.
Case 1) Let s1(E;c;P3) = 02:
Then, by Condition 6.1 we have that E ￿ minfc2 ￿ c1;c2=2g: Now, in the fol-
lowing step E2 = E ￿ s2(E;c;P3); c2
1 = c1 and c2
2 = c2 ￿ s2(E;c;P3): Therefore,
again Condition 6.1 states that s1(E2;c2;P3) = 0 if and only if E ￿ s2(E;c;P3) ￿
c2 ￿ c1 ￿ s2(E;c;P3);which follows from E ￿ c2 ￿ c1; and E ￿ s2(E;c;P3) ￿ (c2=2) ￿
(s2(E;c;P3)=2);which follows from E ￿ c2=2:




1 (E;c;P3) = 0. Therefore, by Remark 3,
_
’
R(E;c;P3) = (0;E) = ’DCe(E;c):
In Cases 2 and 3, we will show that at m = 2 the agent￿ s one Minimal Safety for P3
will be zero. Then, Case 1 can be applied for the remainder Bankruptcy Problem with




1 (E;c;P3) = s1(E;c;P3):
Case 2) Let s1(E;c;P3) > 0; and c2=2 ￿ c2 ￿ c1:
In this case the agents￿Minimal Safety for P3 can be placed in the following regions.



























x1  E3  E5 
Ia IIa  IIIa  IVa  Va  VIa 
E6 
FIGURE 4: Regions of the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual. Case a. The black lines represent all 
the possible sharing of six different levels of the estate (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 and E6). The dots and squares show φCe and 
φDCe, which are the bankruptcy rules marking out the area of all the admissible path of awards satisfying the 













E1 E 4  E3 E 5 E 6 
Ib IIb  IIIb  IVb  Vb  VIb 
FIGURE 5: Regions of the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual. Case b. The black lines represent all the 
possible sharing of six different levels of the estate (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 and E6). The dots and squares show φCe and φDCe, which 
are the bankruptcy rules marking out the area of all the admissible path of awards satisfying the properties in P3. The 
regions are, starting from the estate zero, those areas bounded by an estate and by the next one. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4
Region II.a) c2￿c1 ￿ E ￿ c1: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = (E+c1￿c2)=2 and s2(E;c;P3) =




R(E;c;P3) = ((E + c1 ￿ c2)=2;(E ￿ c1 + c2)=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region III.a) c1 ￿ E ￿ (c1+c2)=2: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = E￿c2=2 and s2(E;c;P3) =




R(E;c;P3) = (E ￿ (c2=2);c2=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region IV.a) (c1+c2)=2 ￿ E ￿ [(c1+c2)=2]+[(c2￿c1)=2] = c2: Then, s1(E;c;P3) =
c1=2 and s2(E;c;P3) = c2=2: Again, from Conditions 6.2 and 6.3 we need to show that
E ￿ c2; which is the Estate-upper bound of this region, and that E ￿ (3c2=4) +
(c1=2);which, taking into account the Estate-upper bound of this region, is true since





Region V.a) c2 ￿ E ￿ 2c1: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = (E +c1 ￿c2)=2 and s2(E;c;P3) =




R(E;c;P3) = ((E + c1 ￿ c2)=2;(E ￿ c1 + c2)=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region VI.a) 2c1 ￿ E: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = (E+c1￿c2)=2 and s2(E;c;P3) = E￿




= ((E + c1 ￿ c2)=2;(E ￿ c1 + c2)=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Case 3) Let s1(E;c;P3) > 0; and c2=2 ￿ c2 ￿ c1: In this case the agents￿Minimal
Safety for P3 can be placed in the following regions.
INSERT FIGURE 5
Region III.b) c2=2 ￿ E ￿ (c1 + c2)=2: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = E ￿ c2=2 and
s2(E;c;P3) = E ￿ c1=2: Conditions 6.2 and 6.3 impose E ￿ c1; inequality ful￿lled




(E ￿ c2=2;c2=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region IV.b) (c1 + c2)=2 ￿ E ￿ c1 + c2=2: Then s1(E;c;P3) = c1=2 and
s2(E;c;P3) = c2=2: Now, Conditions 6.2 and 6.3 impose E ￿ c2 and E ￿ 3c2=4 + c1=2;
and both inequalities are satis￿ed since in this region c2=2 ￿ c2 ￿ c1 which implies
c1 ￿ c2=2: Therefore,
_
’
R(E;c;P3) = (c1=2;E ￿ c1=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region V.b) c1 + c2=2 ￿ E ￿ c2: s1(E;c;P3) = c1=2 and s2(E;c;P3) = E ￿ c1:




R(E;c;P3) = (c1=2;E ￿ c1=2) = ’DCe(E;c):
Region VI.b) c2 ￿ E: Then, s1(E;c;P3) = (E+c1￿c2)=2 and s2(E;c;P3) = E￿c1:




((E + c1 ￿ c2)=2;(E ￿ c1 + c2)=2) = ’DCe(E;c):A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 35
APPENDIX 5. Proof of Propositions 5.5 and 5.6.
This Appendix provides a formal proof of the following results:
Proposition 5.5: There is a bankruptcy problem, (E;c) 2 B; such that
RMS(E;c;P3) 6= ’DCe(E;c):






At this point it is worth noticing the following Fact, in which we will consider,
without loss of generality, (E;c) 2 B0.
Fact 7. Let us note that the Dual Constrained Egalitarian rule (Fact 5), can be written




ci ￿ ￿i if E ￿ C=2
ci ￿ ￿i if E ￿ C=2
;




i (E;c) = E.
Therefore,
(Case a) If E ￿ C=2; we can compute ￿i as:
￿i =
￿
ci 8 i < l
maxfci=2;￿ig 8 i ￿ l
;
where agent l is that one such that
P
j>l













i ￿ l + 1
:
Note also that we should compute ￿ from the highest claimant to the smallest one.
Fact 8. (Case b) If E ￿ C=2; ￿i will denote the losses supported by agent i when
the losses from the claim vector are equal to all the agents subject to no-one obtaining
less than her half-claim.A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems 36
Proposition 5.5: There is a bankruptcy problem, (E;c) 2 B; such that
RMS(E;c;P3) 6= ’DCe(E;c):
Proof. Let us consider the following bankruptcy problem (E;c) 2 B = (21;(5;19:5;20)).
Thus, given the de￿nitions of the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual and Fact
7, we get,
At step m = 1 :
(E1;c1) = (21;(5;19:5;20)):
’Ce(E1;c1) = (2:5;9:25;9:25):
’DCe(E1;c1) = (5 ￿ ￿1;19:5 ￿ ￿2;20 ￿ ￿3):
l = 1 : minf20 ￿ 5;10g + minf19:5 ￿ 5;9:75g = 19:75 < E = 21:
￿3 = 23:5=3 = 7:83 ) ￿3 = maxf10;7:83g = 10:
￿2 = (23:5 ￿ 10)=2 = 6:75 ) ￿2 = maxf9:75;6:75g = 9:75:
￿1 = 23:5 ￿ 10 ￿ 9:75 = 3:75 ) ￿1 = maxf2:5;3:75g = 3:75:
So, ’DCe(E1;c1) = (1:25;9:75;10):
Therefore, s(E1;c1;P3) = (1:25;9:25;9:25):









l = 1 :
minf10:75 ￿ 3:75;5:375g + minf10:25 ￿ 3:75;5:125g = 10:5 > E2 = 1:25:
l = 2 : minf10:75 ￿ 10:25;5:375g = 0:5 < E2 = 1:25:
￿2
3 = (23:5 ￿ 3:75)=2 = 9:875 ) ￿2
3 = maxf5:375;9:875g = 9:875:
￿2
2 = 23:5 ￿ 3:75 ￿ 9:875 = 9:875 ) ￿2
2 = maxf5:125;9:875g = 9:875:
￿2
1 = 3:75:
So, ’DCe(E2;c2) = (0;0:375;0:875):
Therefore,
s(E2;c2;P3) = (0;0:375;0:416); and
P2
k=1 s(Ek;ck;P3) = (1:25;9:625;9:666):









Let us note that l = 2 : minf10:334 ￿ 9:875;5:167g = 0:459 = E3; thus
￿3
3 = 23:5 ￿ 3:75 ￿ 9:875 = 9:875 ) ￿3





So, ’DCe(E3;c3) = (0;0;0:153):
Therefore,
s(E3;c3;P3) = (0;0:375;0:416); and
P3
k=1 s(Ek;ck;P3) = (1:25;9:625;9:819):




RMS(E;c;P3) = (1:25;9:625;10:125) 6= ’DCe(E;c) = (1:25;9:75;10):
Proposition 5.6: The Recursive Minimal Safety Process for P3 does not satisfy
Resource Monotonicity.
Proof. Let us consider the two following Bankruptcy Problem with Legitimate Principles
(E;c;P3) = (22:25;(5;19:5;20);P3); and (E0;c;P3) = (21;(5;19:5;20);P3).
In this case, given the de￿nitions of the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual
we get
RMS(E;c;P3) = (2:5;9:75;10);
and in the previous example we have seen that
RMS(E;c;P3) = (1:25;9:625;10:125):
Obviously, these two distributions contradict Resource Monotonicity since highest
claimant receives less amount when the estate increases.